M.K. Sudarshan
“Ambedkar famously remarked that the Indian Constitution can be both unitary as well as federal according to the requirements of time and circumstances. The real question for us today is: Who gets to decide what the ‘circumstances’ demand—the Union Executive, the Courts, or the States themselves?“
I. The Premise: Why “Classical Federalism” Does Not Exist
In constitutional theory (notably K.C. Wheare’s definition), a “classical federal nation-state” requires two coordinate, independent tiers of government—each supreme within its own sphere—anchored in a single national identity.
Yet across the world’s three largest multi-tiered democratic unions, none fits this textbook ideal:
- The United States possesses the formal architecture of dual federalism (“indestructible union of indestructible states”), yet fiscal gravity (the 16th Amendment and conditional grants) and expansive Commerce Clause jurisprudence have transformed it into a centralized, often coercive federation.
- The European Union possesses supranational legal supremacy, a single market, and a common currency, yet lacks a single sovereign statehood or unified demos—making it a federalizing union of sovereign nation-states (with an explicit exit right under Article 50).
- The Union of India was deliberately engineered as a state-nation rather than a nation-state: a “holding-together” federation with an intentional unitary tilt designed to survive Partition, integrate princely states, and manage deep linguistic and cultural diversity.
The Core Insight: Federalism is not a static destination; it is a negotiated equilibrium between shared rule (security, scale, economic union) and self-rule (regional identity, democratic accountability). What appears as constitutional “incompleteness” is the exact mechanism keeping each union intact.
II. The Indian Constitutional Divide: Two Competing Traditions
Both the “Centripetal” (unitary-leaning) and “Centrifugal” (state-rights) camps among Indian constitutional lawyers draw legitimacy from the same text—because the Constituent Assembly embedded both impulses into the 1950 document.
1. The Case for Unitary Dominance (The Centripetal View)
- Textual & Structural Anchors: Article 1 consciously rejects the term “Federation” in favor of “Union of States.” Articles 249, 256, 352, 356, and 365 grant the Union overriding legislative and executive supremacy, reinforced by All-India Services (Art. 312) and unified judicial and election machinery.
- Key Jurisprudence:
- State of West Bengal v. Union of India (1963): Held that India is not a compact of sovereign states and that the Union possesses sovereign supremacy to acquire state property.
- In re: Article 370 of the Constitution (2023): Reaffirmed asymmetric federalism while upholding the Union’s plenary authority to abrogate special status and reorganize territories under Article 3.
- Core Argument: A dominant center is indispensable for national security, macroeconomic integration, redistribution across unequal regions, and safeguarding individual fundamental rights against local majoritarianism.
2. The Case for Unfettered Federalism (The Centrifugal / State-Rights View)
- Textual & Doctrinal Anchors: States possess plenary, non-delegated legislative authority within List II (State List). Once linguistic states were formed (1956), states became authentic expressions of regional demos rather than mere administrative conveniences.
- Key Jurisprudence:
- S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994): Established federalism as part of the Basic Structure; held that states are not mere appendages of the Center and subjected Article 356 to strict judicial review.
- Union of India v. Mohit Minerals (2022): Held that recommendations of the GST Council are not binding on legislatures, affirming “cooperative and collaborative federalism” where both Union and States possess simultaneous, equal constitutional stature.
- Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India (2018 & 2023): Reinforced representative democracy and asymmetric federalism as vital checks on executive centralization.
- Core Argument: Over-centralization violates the Basic Structure, hollows out democratic accountability, and undermines the principle of subsidiarity—the idea that governance works best when closest to the citizen.
III. Four Constitutional Flashpoints
- The Article 3 Paradox (“Indestructible Union of Destructible States”)
- Question: Does Parliament’s unilateral power to alter boundaries or convert a State into a Union Territory (as in Jammu & Kashmir in 2019) represent a vital constitutional safety valve, or an existential threat to the Basic Structure principle of federalism?
- Fiscal Federalism: Cooperative Pooling or Coercive Centralization?
- Question: Has the post-GST fiscal architecture—combined with the rising share of non-divisible cesses and surcharges—created a U.S.-style “fiscal gravity” that compromises state legislative autonomy?
- The Gubernatorial Veto & Asymmetric Executive Checks (Article 200)
- Question: Where does the Governor’s constitutional duty as a federal link end, and unconstitutional obstruction of an elected state legislature’s mandate begin?
- Delimitation & The Demographic Equity Dilemma
- Question: When the constitutional freeze on Lok Sabha seat reallocation lifts, how should India reconcile “one person, one vote” with federal fairness toward states that stabilized population growth? Does India need a structural reform of the Rajya Sabha toward U.S.-style territorial equality?
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