The Unknown Srivaishnava

UNESCO, Ahobilam, and the Limits of International Recognition for Hindu Temples

In recent months, the Paruveta Utsavam of Sri Lakshmi Narasimha Swamy at Ahobilam has entered the national spotlight with a Parliamentary resolution seeking UNESCO recognition—either as an Intangible Cultural Heritage element or as part of a broader heritage‑conservation framework. The Ahobila Mutt, custodian of the Ahobilam temple for over 750 years, stands at the centre of this debate. Yet, beneath the glitter of the UNESCO brand lie deeper questions about who really controls Hindu temples, what such recognition actually delivers, and whether it is a meaningful safeguard or merely a symbolic crutch.

What UNESCO recognition can and cannot do

UNESCO recognition—whether via the Representative List of Intangible Cultural Heritage or through World Heritage or Asia‑Pacific Awards—carries real prestige. It signals that a tradition is of outstanding cultural value and worthy of safeguarding for future generations. In bureaucratic and diplomatic circles, the “UNESCO tag” becomes a brand that can be used to justify conservation projects, attract specialist expertise, and even flex soft‑power muscle on the global stage.

However, UNESCO does not automatically:
• transfer money to the temple or mutt,
• take over day‑to‑day management,
• or insulate religious institutions from state interference.

Its own World Heritage Fund is small and globally competitive; disbursements are usually advisory, technical, or emergency‑oriented, not recurring temple‑subsidies. Any real financial benefit for Ahobilam will come indirectly, filtered through state and central governments, tourism bodies, and contractors—precisely the actors whose behaviour the Hindu community most fears.

Sri Rangam: A cautionary tale

The Sri Ranganathaswamy Temple at Srirangam has already received a UNESCO Asia‑Pacific Award of Merit for its conservation work. That award was a hard‑earned recognition of a massive, traditional‑method restoration project, completed with careful engineering and devotion to heritage. Yet, for many devotees and scholars, the daily reality of Sri Rangam does not match the gloss of the award. The temple’s self‑governance remains constrained, the HR&CE system continues to manage assets and appointments, and the lived experience of darshan, utsava, and kshetra‑saukhyam is often strained by poor infrastructure and political‑bureaucratic interference.

Sri Rangam thus offers a sobering lesson: UNESCO recognition can adorn a temple; it cannot, by itself, reform a state bureaucracy that has long treated temples as revenue‑yielding assets rather than devalayas. If even a UNESCO‑honoured, arch‑Vaishnava temple in Tamil Nadu struggles to translate prestige into structural autonomy and better governance, how much more must one be cautious before imagining UNESCO as a miracle‑cure for Ahobilam?

Ahobilam and the Ahobila Mutt: 750 years under pressure

The Ahobila Mutt is not some new NGO or state‑appointed body; it is a paramparā that has guided Ahobilam for three‑quarters of a millennium. Its claim to custodianship is rooted in sampradaya‑siddha tradition, acharya‑pādukā‑seva, and deep ritual continuity.

The Supreme Court has, in no uncertain terms, upheld that temples founded by religious institutions belong to those institutions, and that the state cannot unilaterally “take over” or appoint an Executive Officer without violating the Article 26(d) right to manage religious affairs.

Yet, every time a new government comes to power in Andhra Pradesh or Telangana, the Ahobilam temple becomes a theatre of political contest. The standard playbook emerges: fresh claims of “mismanagement”, loud public justifications for “take‑over”, and attempts to impose an EO or parallel control. Even though the courts have repeatedly struck these moves down, the cycle re‑starts with each new political regime. The Mutt is then dragged into litigation, administrative tussles, and bureaucratic entanglements, instead of being free to focus on siddha‑pātras, śāstra‑pāṭha, and the nitya‑utsava‑nityakarma cycle.

In such a context, UNESCO recognition cannot act as a shield against political vicissitudes. A new government will not hesitate to interfere simply because the Paruveta Utsavam figures in a UNESCO‑linked list. The Mutt remains vulnerable not to a lack of international tags, but to a systemic refusal to respect its constitutional and traditional autonomy.

Why then seek UNESCO recognition?

Given all this, the question arises: Why should the Ahobila Mutt or its allies want a UNESCO‑style branding at all?

There are a few, limited, tactical reasons, which must be recognised for what they are—tools, not solutions.

Documentation and narrative armour
UNESCO‑linked dossiers require detailed documentation of rituals, music, agama links, and sampradaya history. Once this is on record, it becomes harder for any state‑appointed body to suddenly “re‑design” the Paruveta Utsavam or shrug aside mutt advice as “unscientific” or “irrelevant.” The Mutt can then point to its internationally recognised living‑tradition status in any legal or policy debate.
Diplomatic and reputational pressure
If the festival is inscribed as Intangible Cultural Heritage, any attempt to politicise or commercialise it can attract subtle diplomatic and reputational costs. The state risks being seen as undermining a recognised heritage, which can be useful in negotiations over crowd‑management plans, infrastructure projects, or land‑use around the temple.
Potential for better‑justified funding
UNESCO recognition can help “brand” Ahobilam as a heritage‑ and pilgrimage‑destination in policy documents, making it easier for the Centre or the State to justify:
• conservation projects,
• improved utilities and sanitation,
• and crowd‑management infrastructure.
But—crucially—these funds still flow through state and endowment machinery, not directly to the Mutt. The real test is whether the Mutt is allowed to participate in the design and execution of such projects, or merely treated as a ceremonial actor.

The deeper question: Is the Hindu community unable to preserve its own heritage?

The sub‑text of the entire debate is my own question:

If the Hindu community is capable of preserving its temples and utsavas, why does it need to seek validation from an international body like UNESCO? Worse, if powerful institutions like the Ahobila Mutt cannot, in practice, manage Ahobilam according to hoary traditions, does that indicate a deeper failure of Hindu agency?

The answer lies not in the Mutt but in the structures that have been imposed upon it.

For over a century, the logic of the HR&CE‑style regime—first under colonial “court of wards” thinking, then under Dravidian‑state models—has steadily eroded temple autonomy.

Temples are treated as “state property” or “public assets,” while mutts, mathas, and kshetra‑samsthas are marginalised, bypassed, or portrayed as inefficient. The result is not a dharmic institution failing to preserve heritage; it is a dharma‑sādhu institution being systematically constrained, under‑funded, and over‑politicised.

In such a context, UNESCO recognition is not proof that the Hindu community cannot preserve its heritage. Rather, it can at best only serve as a diplomatic lever to expose the disconnect between the sacred‑status of the Paruveta Utsavam and the secular, often corrupt, machinery that surrounds it. The Mutt is perhaps not asking UNESCO to “save” Ahobilam; it may be using UNESCO‑linked recognition to argue: “We have the will and tradition; grant us the constitutional and administrative autonomy to act on it.”

Financial benefits: real, but indirect and risky

Could UNESCO branding bring money to Ahobilam or the Mutt? Only in an indirect sense.

• It may attract more state and central funding for conservation, roads, drainage, and other infrastructure projects, because the site is now “high‑value heritage.”
• It may boost pilgrimage‑tourism footfall, increasing donations, prasadam sales, and related income streams.

But these benefits are not guaranteed to reach the Mutt or the devotee in a transparent or equitable way. If the Andhra‑Telangana temple‑administration model parallels the Tamil HR&CE pattern, much of the revenue and authority will remain with the state‑controlled machinery. UNESCO status can even incentivise commercialisation—more hotels, more “heritage‑tour” packages—without necessarily improving darshan‑quality, sadhana‑environment, or ritual integrity.

In short, UNESCO will not write cheques to the Ahobila Mutt; it may, at best, help the Mutt argue for better funding and better management channels. The real question is whether those channels will be devotional‑autonomous or state‑dominated.

Conclusion: Recognition with dignity, not dependence

The debate over UNESCO recognition for the Paruveta Utsavam at Ahobilam should not be reduced to a binary of “pro‑UNESCO” versus “anti‑UNESCO.” The deeper issue is who controls Hindu temples—the sampradaya or the state.

• If UNESCO recognition is used to reinforce Article 26(d) autonomy, strengthen mutt‑centred conservation, and build transparent, dharma‑friendly funding mechanisms, it can be a tactical ally.

• If it is used mainly to enhance the state’s image, justify more bureaucratic control, or glamorise “heritage‑tourism” without real devolution, then it will be yet another symbolic ornament over a still‑crippled temple‑governance system.

For the Ahobila Mutt, the highest goal is not an international tag but the restoration of its traditional authority to manage Ahobilam according to sampradaya‑siddha norms, free from the cycle of political take‑overs and administrative interference. UNESCO recognition, at its best, can help highlight that ideal; but only a constitutional and cultural re‑assertion of Hindu temple autonomy can make it real.

Sudarshan Madabushi

(Ahobila Mutt “sishya”)

Pity the Europeans… as Trump rubs more salt and insult into their wounded pride

What are we to make of this man’s mental health ?!

First he starts a war with Iran unilaterally without consulting any of his European allies in the hope that America would finish the war in a week — à la Venezuela — and that Iran will “totally surrender to His Highness”.

When things however start going awry on the war front in Iran , he starts calling out to his so-called European allies to send warships to attack Iran.

When the allies all baulk , he throws spite and insults at them all, calling them “cowards”.

Now that the war is dragging on for more than a month, he finds he has utterly lost control over the Hormuz straits and World oil supply is now in shambles and has thrown all economies of allies and of the rest of the world too into a tizzy.

As Iran’s chokehold over Hormuz only further tightens, POTUS realises that America alone cannot succeed in opening up the straits without suffering heavy casualty in terms of huge costs, human and financial.

So, now he’s desperate. He tucks tail but cannot be seen to be running away from the war. So how to save face and a bashed nose ? … He turns on Europe and yells , “If you want oil from the Hormuz go get it yourself!”

In a war that he finds he’s unable to finish by himself, he’s now hell bent on dragging half the world into it. “If you don’t join me in my war , you don’t deserve to get the oil and gas flowing through the Hormuz”.

Pathetic is the plight of the Europeans for they still don’t realise that “Daddy” Donald Trump has made them the first grave casualty in a War that was launched by him which they knew nothing about it until was already half lost .

Pity the Europeans … if the Iranians can hold up to ransom a quarter of world’s oil and gas supply to try and force Donald Trump to end the senseless War, he will on the other hand do one better than they : he’ll hold to ransom all the Hormuz oil and gas just to force Europeans to help keep the bloody war raging on.

What a sick , demented way of thinking !

Sudarshan Madabushi

“…Only by my own morality, my own mind,” … that is “the only thing that can stop me,” Donald Trump, POTUS

Donald Trump when asked about the Constitutional and moral limits imposed upon the power of the POTUS retorted in the interview (with outlets such as CBS and the New York Times: “… only by my own morality, my own mind,” and that is “the only thing that can stop me…” That was Trump’s conception of executive power, the role of the American Constitution, and of whether international law binds him or not.

Interviewers pressed him on whether courts, treaties, or international norms can actually check his actions, and Trump replied in substance that those constraints are irrelevant because “we’ll never get to the courts” or the Constitution—he will act if he feels it is “good for our country,” and his own “morality” is the only real limit.

The President’s laconic, arrogant line clearly reflected his personal philosophy: an ultra‑expansive view of presidential authority, especially as his administration at the time of the interview was contemplating or carrying out aggressive actions abroad (e.g., talks about Venezuela, Greenland, and broader military deployments, and the war on Iran planning), and critics were warning him that he would fall foul of legal or institutional checks and balances.

“I don’t have any moral compulsions except what I feel inside myself. I follow my own instinct. If I think it’s right, it’s right; I don’t have to listen to the press, the so‑called experts, or the establishment.”

By centring “his own morality” as the sole brake, Trump effectively was declaring that ethics, law, and precedent are optional for him. What matters to him really is his gut‑level sense of “what feels right”. That was the only real constraint on what he may do in war, sanctions, or territorial‑style maneuvers.

The above retort of the POTUS delivered in a dismissive tone clearly suggests that his personal sense of “rightness” supersedes legal, diplomatic, or ethical norms. In effect, it frames his war decisions not as constrained by international law, norms, or even traditional conservative‑realist doctrine, but by his own subjective “gut” and appetite for spectacle.

Given that he possesses that megalomaniac moral sense, it should surprise no one therefore that the imperious Donald Trump has gone on record in the last few weeks to make the most outrageous, repugnant and obnoxious statements ever made by a Head of State of the United States of America before him.

Just start scrolling:

On bombing, Europe, and personal whim

“Bombing for fun” style line:
In a televised appearance, Trump suggested that he could continue the bombing campaign against Iran indefinitely, adding with a smirk that he might “keep bombing for fun.” This line encapsulates his tendency to frame a major war as an extension of personal will rather than a strictly calibrated military‑diplomatic strategy.
“Europeans are cowards”:
Speaking at a White House‑style briefing, Trump dismissed NATO and European partners, saying something very close to:“The Europeans are cowards. They talk a lot, but they didn’t come to our aid when it counted… nobody wanted to stand with us except a few Gulf countries.”He then repeatedly contrasted this with what he calls “strong friends” in the Gulf, portraying Europe as weak and unreliable in the Iran war.

On Saudi Arabia and Gulf allies

“Saudi King came kissing my ass”:
At a Saudi‑backed event in Florida, Trump laced his remarks with crude, performative theatrics. About the Saudi Crown Prince, he said in substance:“He didn’t think this was going to happen. He didn’t think he’d be kissing my ass… he thought I would just be another American president of a country going downhill. But now he has to be nice to me… he better be nice to me.”Immediately afterward, he turned on the praise, calling the same Crown Prince a “fantastic man” and “a strong leader,” which underlines the transactional, almost vaudevillian tone of his war‑time rhetoric.
Gulf allies as “with us more than NATO”:
Trump has also said outright that Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE have “stood with us more than NATO,” adding:“They’re doing more so far than NATO… in all fairness, they’re with us.” This line typically appears alongside his more vulgar quips, reinforcing the image of him as a deal‑maker who treats allies as props in a personal power‑show.

*****

America today is ruled not by its Constitution. It is now Pax Don Trumpia. And God Bless America!

Sudarshan Madabushi

So appalling is the way this POTUS blusters and bluffs about the Iran War to bamboozle his countrymen!

Trump’s Iran rhetoric vs the ground reality

Below is a side‑by‑side look at Donald Trump’s bravado statements about Iran and what independent reporting and analyses actually show. This is a non‑exhaustive list of the POTUS’s key bluster and bluff statements in near‑verbatim phrasings, grouped by topic and linked to known sources.

On Iran’s nuclear program and infrastructure

White House statement (press release, June 2025):
Trump is quoted in an official White House release as saying:

“Monumental damage was done to all nuclear sites in Iran, as shown by satellite images. Obliteration is an accurate term! The white structure shown is deeply imbedded into the rock, with even its roof well below ground level, and completely shielded from flame. The biggest damage took place far below ground level. Bullseye!!!”

Speech on the same strike (June 21, 2025), via news reports:
Multiple outlets report Trump declaring:

“Iran’s key nuclear enrichment facilities have been completely and totally obliterated.”

On social media and in follow‑ups, he repeated variants such as:

“Iran’s nuclear program has been obliterated.”

On Iran’s navy and air force

White House press‑briefing style remark (early March 2026):
Al Jazeera reports Trump saying at the White House with the German Chancellor:

“We’ve successfully eliminated the nation’s air force and navy.”

Later, more flamboyant version (mid‑March 2026):
Middle East Eye and several wire services quote Trump at a public event:

“Iran’s leaders have been wiped off the face of the earth… the Iranian navy has been destroyed, the air force no longer exists, and their missiles, drones, and everything they own are being annihilated.”

Swearing‑in‑of‑Homeland‑Security‑Secretary remarks (late March 2026):
Indian‑language and international outlets paraphrase‑then‑quote Trump saying:

“We’re in negotiations right now. I can tell you, they’d like to make a deal and who wouldn’t if you were there? Look, their navy’s gone, their air force is gone, their communications are gone. Pretty much everything they have is gone.”

On regime leadership and “regime change”

Claim about Iran’s top leadership and regime structure (late March 2026):
The New York Times reports Trump aboard Air Force One saying:

“We’ve had regime change. The regime was eliminated, they’re all dead. The next regime is mostly dead.”

He then added:

“It truly is regime change… you can’t do much better than that.”

Comments on Mojtaba Khamenei (successor‑designate):
Multiple outlets quote Trump asserting that Iran’s new supreme‑leader‑designate has been effectively eliminated:

“He may be alive, but he’s obviously very seriously… wounded.”

Around the same time, he also reportedly said:

“Iran’s leadership has been wiped out.”

On the overall war and “victory”

Self‑declared “victory” in the conflict:
Indian‑language and international outlets attribute to Trump the line:

“We’ve won the war, and Iran’s navy and air force have been completely decimated.”

He has also repeated in public:

“We’re performing quite well,” when pressed about the ongoing operations.

What stands out versus reality on the ground

Several independent assessments and satellite analyses note that:

Only one major enrichment site was largely destroyed, while others were damaged but not “completely obliterated,” and Iran’s nuclear program has continued, albeit slower.
Iran’s navy and air force remain operational, even if degraded, and its leadership structure has not collapsed as claimed.

There’s been in the last few days so much more Bluster coming from this POTUS contrasting with evidence available on:

• On backchannels: Trump repeatedly invokes “secret talks” and “major agreements” with unnamed Iranian leaders, but:
• No public text, signatories, or concrete verification of a deal exists.[cnbctv18 +2]
• Iranian officials deny formal negotiations, casting these claims as part of a psychological or market‑manipulation campaign.[fortune +1]

• On oil seizure: Trump’s talk about “taking the oil” and “seizing Kharg Island” is consistently framed as a threat or preference, not as an executed plan:
• No documented order, international‑law justification, or on‑the‑ground occupation of Iranian oil infrastructure has been confirmed.
• Analysts treat these remarks as escalatory bravado rather than a description of actual military‑administrative control.

******* ******* *********

Sudarshan Madabushi

The “Demon” that has caught America, Israel and the Arab GCC states with their pants down

For more than seven decades, American grand strategy toward Iran has been guided by a single, narrowing obsession: how to secure U.S. access to oil and gas in Iran and the broader Central Asian energy belt. From the 1953 coup against Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh to the present crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, Washington’s gaze has never shifted far from the barrel of crude.

Iran, in American eyes, was never a full‑fledged nation with its own history, dignity, and strategic geography; it was a reservoir of energy to be controlled, and a potential spoiler of that control to be contained.

After the 1979 Islamic Revolution shattered the Shah’s pro‑Western order, Washington’s posture hardened into what many Iranians now see as a policy of “Death to Iran.” This was not, at first, a formal military declaration. It was a slow‑motion economic war, built on sweeping sanctions, banking cutoffs, and export bans that strangled not only the Iranian leadership but the lives of ordinary citizens. Hospitals, medicine, agriculture, and basic imports all fell within the shadow of American‑designed hardship.

The United States mistook the policy of impoverishment for the policy of containment, believing that if the people were made to suffer, the regime would either collapse or be forced to surrender on Washington’s terms.

In this grim calculus, Israel acted not merely as an ally, but as mentor and active abettor. Eager to see Iran weakened, Jerusalem nudged Washington toward ever‑more maximalist measures, subtly reinforcing the idea that pressure through sanctions, cyber‑sabotage, and covert action could substitute for a genuine long‑term strategy.

Arab Gulf states too, in turn, watched from the sidelines, silently applauding; their rulers were relieved that the United States, not their own militaries, bore the risk and cost of confronting Tehran. The GCC, in this way, became silent beneficiaries of a policy that spoke of “regional security” but in practice meant outsourcing Iran’s management to Washington.

What is most striking in this entire arc is what did not occupy the foreground of American strategic thinking. The Strait of Hormuz, and to a lesser degree the Bab al‑Mandeb, never figured in any serious, sustained way as the central nodes of power in the Middle East. American planners in the White House, State Department, Pentagon, and CIA chased the “shadow” of the demon—regime rhetoric, nuclear ambitions, ballistic‑missile tests, militia proxies—while ignoring the demon’s real bodily presence : Iran’s geographic position at the heart of the world’s most critical energy chokepoints.

For decades, Washington treated Hormuz as a technical problem for navies, not a strategic inflection point for the entire global order. The United States relied on the Gulf monarchies, on periodic patrols, and on the illusion that the status quo could be preserved through a mix of gunships, satellite surveillance, and sanctions. The demon, in this reading, was ideological or nuclear; it was not the simple, brutal fact of geography that gave Iran the power to choke the arteries of global trade.

Now, that demon has finally stepped out into the open. With the 2026 U.S.–Israeli strike campaign against Iran’s leadership and nuclear‑related infrastructure, and the subsequent Iranian decision to assert direct control over the Strait of Hormuz, the demon has shown what it truly is: a geographic weapon that requires no nuclear bomb to wield decisive power.

Iran has demonstrated that by threatening, or even selectively controlling, the flow of oil and gas through Hormuz, it can put America, Israel, and the GCC on a single, shared leash. The strait, once treated as a footnote to grand strategy, has become the very center of gravity in the region.

America, Israel, and the Gulf monarchies are now caught with their pants down. The policy of impoverishment did not topple the Iranian state; it deepened Iran’s defensive resolve and pushed its leadership to invest in asymmetric tools that could exploit their geographic advantage. The policy of containment, never honestly conceived, has collapsed against the reality of a chokepoint that Tehran can now claim to control.

The GCC, which once believed itself insulated by American protection, now finds that its own survival is hostage to decisions made in Tehran and Washington.

In this moment of reckoning, the old narrative must be reversed. The demon is not elsewhere, in speeches or missiles; it sits in the strategic decisions that were never made—the planners who failed to see Hormuz as the hinge of power, the leaders who mistook economic cruelty for geopolitical wisdom, and the allies who cheered from the sidelines while assuming the United States would carry the burden forever.

The lesson is not simply that Iran has grown stronger. It is that those who ignored geography, and who mistook pressure for strategy, have now found themselves staring at the very chokepoint they spent decades pretending did not matter.

Sudarshan Madabushi

The Choke Points of the world that Big Powers fight over

A SIMPLE CHART UNVEILS TO ME THE WHOLE OF THE DARK, OMINOUS THEATRE OF “COLD WORLD-WAR-III” IN THE 21st-CENTURY THAT INDIA IS DEFINITELY GOING TO SEE !

Both World War I and II were fought by the then world’s mightiest military and economic powers for dominance and absolute control over “strategic sea lanes” that were connected by the Straits of Gibraltar, Bosphorus and Suez which in turn were for them the keys and gateways to large swathes of continental territory across Europe, Russia, Middle-East, and Near-East Asia.

Gibraltar, Bosphorus and Suez were called as the world’s “choke points”.

Anyone in a position and with sufficient power to wield a stranglehold over these “choke points” got to be effectively the “emperor of the whole world” . A giant proportion of the world’s trade, industry and commerce flows at that time in history took place only in and around Europe and the Atlantic continental seaboards… And all of it had to flow only through these “choke points”.

Hence, Hitler of Germany, Mussolini of Italy and Hirohito of Japan who led their powerful countries to all-out Wars against the world all once did, in one way or the other, aspire to such global Emperor-hood.

What is the scene today ?

Dominance if not absolute control over these “choke-points” in the arterial sea lanes continues today to hold the potential to be able, in fell swoop, to “choke off” nations and peoples’ life, liberty and livelihoods… In other words, any power that controls them could at will turn-on and turn-off all traffic of trade, industry and commerce, traffic of military arms too and also all movement of peoples through and to and fro any part or parts of any one or more region in the world .

Thus indeed it is for that reason that over the years it has become a constant theme in the history of “super-power rivalry” of the world since the last two World Wars, that the most powerful countries (economically and militarily) will never cease waging a relentless “cold war” with each other to seize control and dominance over these arterial “choke points” in the sea lanes of the world.

Now, in the 21st century the very same “cold war” for “choke points” is going to be fought … not between Anglo-Saxon antagonists amongst themselves this time but … between them and the great new superpower of the world — CHINA .

Why ?

Because trade, industry and commerce flows today do not swirl around circulating mostly as they did once in the time of WW-I and II only around Europe and the trans-Atlantic continents. Today that traffic is mostly if not predominantly between the Trans-Atlantic continents of the world and Pan-Asiatic mainland China .

China therefore now is stepping forward boldly and aggressively and is posing the challenge to the rest of the world in terms as follows:

“If you Anglo-Saxon world-powers (US, UK, EU and Australia/New Zealand) can wield control over the Western and Middle-Eastern “choke points” of Gibraltar, Bosphorus and Suez why should I, China, an equal superpower, not seize control or dominance over other emerging strategic “choke points” in Eastern pan-Indian Oceania which straddles that part of the globe that stretches between the Straits of Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb, Cape of Good hope and Malacca?”

China has started raising today an increasingly rude, “in-your-face” question to the Western Trans-Atlantic/Pan-Anglo-Saxon powers : “Why must you guys alone wield the power of “turn-on, “turn-off” switching at strategic “choke-points” of the world ? Why should I not have and wield the same power over Malacca, Cape of Good Hope and Hormuz as you do over Gibraltar, Suez, Bab El-Mandeb and Panama ?”

During World War I and II , the dynamics of super-power rivalry did not impact much the strategic security concerns of India . India was the “jewel in the crown” of the British Sovereign who was sworn to keep her territory in India protected from harm. Also, India at that time in history was only a bit-player in the great epic drama of super-power rivalry and war . The “choke-points” of the Western and Middle Eastern sea lanes did not really hold any “strategic significance” for India. The Wars fought then were not really India’s business.

The situation is, however, not so today … and will not be so too in the rest of the 8 more decades still left in the 21st century ?

Why ?!

Because India is today a bit like a poor deer caught flat-footed in the darkness in the middle of a forest highway-turning… momentarily frozen and paralysed with fear and confusion, blinded by the sudden, white flashing glare of beams of powerful headlamps thrown at it by two powerful SUV trucks converging on it menacingly from both sides !

Because of where India’s geography happens to be where it exactly is, unfortunately, India willy-nilly is going to be definitely dragged into the politics of the super-powers’ titanic struggle for control over the “choke points” in the neighbourhood of the ocean in its very own backyard : the Indian Ocean . The Indian Ocean, right in the middle of which India stands, is going to be without a shred of doubt the central theatre of war in which the great 21st-century’s Cold World-War warriors, the Anglo-Saxon Axis of US, UK-EU and Australia is going fight China … and this War too will have to be fought to the finish.

In this great looming “World Cold-War” India must make the right choices if it must emerge eventually on the right side of History.

What are those choices likely to be?

Only PM Mr Modi and his MEA, Mr Jaishankar, probably know ?

But who knows, perhaps the small secretive group of members attending the ongoing “G7-meeting” in London today (May 5 2021) might have have an inkling of it too ?!

I don’t know .

One thing however is for sure … you and I , ordinary citizens of India … will have no clue until perhaps , God forbid, the Cold World War-III is already upon us !

Bhaarath Maatha ki Jai !
Sudarshan Madabushi 🇮🇳

The Debt (“Rishi Rnam”) of ‘noblesse oblige’ owed to Saint Thyagaraja by the Carnatic Music world

Today a reflective morning mood prompted me to think up and ask three pointed questions to the Perplexity AI engine.

The three questions and the Answers obtained are given below in seriatum.

Question No. 1

Saint Thyagaraja composed more than a thousand “kritis” out of intense Bhakthi. He was not a musician nor was Carnatic music his career . Music for him was mystic communion with the divine.

Today , musicians and music aficionados thrive on Thyagaraja’s compositions as professional artistes on stage , earning millions of rupees as remuneration for their “kutcheri” all over the world. Many artistes today have made lucrative careers out of Thyagaraja songs.

If Thyagaraja had patent copyright over all his compositions today, how much money would he have potentially earned by way of royalties from the world of Carnatic music? What is the best guesstimate?

ANSWER:

Saint Tyagaraja composed around 700-1,000 kritis, many of which form the core of modern Carnatic kutcheris, often comprising 30-50% or more of a typical concert’s repertoire.

Market Overview

Carnatic music relies heavily on live performances, with Chennai’s Margazhi season alone featuring thousands of kutcheris across major sabhas. Top artists like Sudha Ragunathan and T.M. Krishna command fees around ₹5-10 lakhs per high-profile concert (adjusted for inflation from older data), while mid-tier earn ₹50,000-2 lakhs; global shows add premium pricing. India’s music industry distributed over ₹600 crore in royalties last year, though classical forms like Carnatic represent a small fraction amid Bollywood dominance.

Royalty Estimation

Hypothetical royalties for public performances in India typically run 3% of gross ticket/sponsorship revenue after 15% venue deductions. Assuming 10,000 annual pro kutcheris worldwide (Chennai season ~3,000, plus global/dispersed), average gross ₹2 lakhs each, Thyagaraja share 40% usage, yields ~₹50 crore total live revenue base.

At 3% royalty, that’s ₹1.5 crore annually; scaling for recordings/digital (minor) pushes a guesstimate to ₹2-5 crore per year today.

Key Assumptions

• Concerts: Conservative; actual may exceed with private/corporate events.
• Usage: High dominance in repertoires, per expert consensus.
• No historical claim, pure hypothetical; earnings shared with accompanists in reality.

Question No.2

What usage sources generate most royalties for Carnatic music?

ANSWER

Live performances generate the majority of royalties and income for Carnatic music, as the genre relies almost entirely on kutcheris rather than robust digital or recording streams.

Top Sources

• Live Concerts: Primary revenue via sabha fees, sponsorships, and tickets during seasons like Chennai Margazhi (thousands of events); most artist earnings and hypothetical composition royalties stem here.

• Digital Streaming/Live Streams: Growing post-pandemic (70% of overall Indian music royalties from streaming), but low monetization for Carnatic due to free access culture and niche audience.

• Recordings/CDs: Minimal, with limited sales and poor artist/label payouts; commercial live recordings add little.

Question No. 3

Hypothetically again, from whom or which institution would royalty income flow to Thyagaraja ? And in what conceivable contractual form?

ANSWER

Hypothetically, royalty income for Tyagaraja’s compositions would flow through India’s performing rights organizations (PROs), primarily the Indian Performing Right Society (IPRS), which manages public performance and broadcasting rights for musical works on behalf of composers and publishers.

Primary Institutions

IPRS would act as the key collector, issuing public performance licenses to concert organizers (e.g., sabhas like Music Academy), venues, broadcasters, and streaming platforms for live kutcheris, recordings, or online events. Phonographic Performance Limited (PPL) handles sound recordings separately, but Thyagaraja’s focus would be on underlying compositions via IPRS.

Flow Mechanism

Organizers pay blanket or per-event license fees to IPRS based on tariffs (e.g., percentage of gross revenue), which pools and distributes royalties quarterly using logs, setlists, or usage data from concerts and media. For global use, international reciprocal agreements (e.g., via CISAC) would route foreign royalties back through IPRS.

Contractual Forms

• Membership Agreement: Tyagaraja (or estate) assigns non-exclusive public performance rights to IPRS via a standard membership contract, retaining ownership while authorizing global licensing.

• License Agreements: Event hosts sign IPRS public performance licenses (annual/blanket or event-specific), with terms like upfront fees, audits, and penalties for non-compliance (18% interest + 30% penalty).

• Publishing Assignment: Optional deal with a music publisher for administration, sub-licensing, and mechanical royalties (e.g., recordings), taking 20-50% commission.

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The Upshot

The upshot of all my above conversations with Perplexity-AI is that finally now I have got a pretty approximate idea of the quantified total estimated Debt that the world of Carnatic Music morally owes to Sri Thyagaraja.

In other words, I now can imagine a broad picture of Sri Thyagaraja — i.e. if were alive today in flesh and blood and perhaps also as commercial-minded as I see our musicians are today in India across the board — rightfully coming forward to claim settlement of the debt owed to him by the Carnatic Music world, based on retrospective cumulation and compounding of the sum of royalties not paid to him all these years for his “kritis”. Perplexity-AI engine helped me also to do the back-of-the-envelop maths on this as below:

Indian courts reject perpetual or moral rights revival for ancient compositions. Copyright doesn’t apply retroactively to public domain works like Tyagaraja’s (pre-1920s Indian law), so no legal claim exists. So, the Carnatic Music world can heave a big collective sigh of relief!

However, hypothetically assuming new moral/publishing rights, Thyagaraja’s cumulative demand would cover ~180 years (1847–2026).

Tyagaraja lived from 1767 to 1847 (about 80 years), with major compositions spanning roughly 1800–1847; modern Carnatic usage greatly surged post-1900 via disciples and sabhas.

Annual royalties today that Thyagaraja could potentially earn is ~₹2-5 crore (as estimated above).

Projecting backward with conservative growth: negligible pre-1950 (<₹1 crore total), ramping via inflation (6-8% avg), kutcheri expansion (post-1970s), and digital (2010s)—yields ₹200-500 crore cumulative in present value (discounted at 5%). Undiscounted nominal sum: ₹1,000-2,000 crore.

Thus, the total outstanding Debt owed today by Carnatic Music artistes and Sabha aficionados — after they have made merry earning a livelihood out of Thyagaraja “kritis” for more than a century now — is an astounding amount of ₹. 1.25 billion … at the very least.

It is my hope that all Vidwans, Sabhas, corporate sponsors, students and Rasikas — everyone who looks upon Thyagaraja Bhakthi as something that can be monetized too in the frenetic marketplace of classical performing arts— will all remain however humble and mindful out of a sense of noblesse oblige; out of realization arising from deep collective moral indebtedness to the spirit of Saint Thyagaraja.

“nidhicAla sukhamA rAmuni sannidhi sEva sukhamA nijamuga balku manasA”

Sudarshan Madabushi

Has India’s budget spending on Defence and National Security been as smart and wise as Iran’s turns out to be today ?

Please take a good, long and hard look at the table below .

India’s total defence budget outlay has risen 8 fold in the last 25 years ( $11 billion to $91 billion) while Iran’s has risen only 3 times (from around $3 billion to $8 billion in the same period).

In 2001, India and Iran defence spending budget was almost the same at c. $ 10 billion. In 2025, Indian defense outlay however was 12 times bigger than Iran’s.

Yet , in per-capita terms the defence spending of India today in 2025 is lower than that of Iran ( $6.2 million Vs $ 9.5 billion)… And this in spite of the crippling economic sanctions that was imposed on Iran by the entire world (except maybe China, Russia and North Korea and to a very small extent by India) in the last 25 years!

India in the last 25 years has been spending year on year billions of USD on defence procurements of hi-end, hi-tech and big-ticket armaments from the West. Whereas severely sanctioned Iran seems to have had no other choice but to invest only in relatively low-end , low-tech , cost-effective missile and drone technology with which, however to the whole world’s astonishment, in the ongoing war with the combined might of Israel and America, Iran has so far been able to extract a heavy price from both countries in terms of pain, pelf and prestige !

So, the question I now ask myself is this :

Was Iran wiser and much smarter than India in investing and spending on its defense and national security in the last 25 years?

Was there probably overspending if not profligacy on the part of the MoD and Defence General Staff in going for such “big-ticket and heavy-hitting miltary hardware” — through Rafael jets, Bofors howitzers, Apache helicopters, Russian second-hand aircraft carriers and Israeli radar systems— and underspending on cost-effective spending strategies on less sophisticated but no less deadly asymmetry-warfare arsenal , such as what Iran seems to have adopted with not inconsiderable success today ?

Food for thought indeed for the Comptroller and Auditor General of India ( past and present)?

Hmm… I wonder ! 🤔

Sudarshan Madabushi

Is India equipped to fight modern conventional and asymmetrical warfare with lethal drones ? 3 Questions.

My 3 questions to AI this morning:

The ongoing war in Iran and Ukraine confirm that modern warfare today is prosecuted not with battle tanks and fighter jets but with lethal drones .

1. Is India equipped and weaponised in that department?

2. Is there a major chink in India’s Defence preparedness for modern warfare.

AI response :

Drones have indeed become pivotal in modern conflicts like Ukraine and the Iran-Israel war, enabling precision strikes and reconnaissance while minimizing risks to personnel, though tanks and jets retain critical roles in combined arms operations.

India lags in operational lethal drone numbers compared to peers, highlighting a gap in high-end UCAV readiness, but rapid procurements and indigenous efforts are addressing this.

Drone Roles in Conflicts:

In Ukraine, FPV and long-range drones like Shaheds dominate, destroying tanks and disrupting advances, with over 4,400 launched monthly by Russia in early 2026—reshaping tactics toward drone-heavy attrition.

Iran’s ongoing exchanges with Israel feature drone interceptions and retaliatory swarms alongside missiles, underscoring air defense vulnerabilities.

Tanks and jets persist for breakthroughs and air superiority, but cheap drones amplify asymmetric threats.

India’s Position
India’s ~6-10 lethal drones pale against Pakistan’s 100+ and China’s thousands, potentially exposing gaps in sustained strike endurance.

However, doctrines emphasize swarms, kamikaze munitions (e.g., 850 procured), and AI integration, with 31 MQ-9Bs incoming to bolster maritime and border ops.

India’s armed forces maintain a modest inventory of lethal (armed or combat-capable) drones, primarily consisting of reconnaissance UAVs with limited strike capabilities and a small number of dedicated armed platforms.

Exact current figures as of March 2026 are not publicly disclosed due to military sensitivity, but estimates from reliable defense analyses indicate fewer than 10 operational lethal drones, with the total UAV fleet (mostly unarmed) under 200 units.

Current Estimates

The Indian military’s drone fleet totals around 179 units as of late 2023, dominated by Israeli Heron and Searcher models used mainly for reconnaissance.

Only a handful qualify as lethal: 4 Heron TP (potentially armable) in the Army and 2 leased SeaGuardian (recon-attack) in the Navy.

No large-scale armed drone squadrons are confirmed operational yet.

Key Platforms

Heron TP: 4 units (Army); medium-altitude long-endurance, capable of strikes but primarily recon.
SeaGuardian (MQ-9B variant): 2 leased units (Navy); armed with missiles for maritime strikes.
Most others (e.g., 108 Searcher, 65+ Heron 1) are unarmed surveillance types.

Procurements

India is expanding rapidly: 31 MQ-9B Predators approved from the US (not yet delivered), plus plans for 56 Heron TP and 87 indigenous MALE drones by 2029-30.

Loitering munitions like 850 kamikaze drones are in procurement but represent expendable, tactical assets rather than reusable inventory. These will significantly boost lethal capacity soon.

Enhancement Efforts
Procurements include 87 MALE drones and Shaktibaan regiments for unmanned warfare; total UAV pool exceeds 100k including tactical assets. This aligns with global shifts, mitigating the “chink” through scale and autonomy rather than sheer numbers alone.

3. Are comparative figures of Pakistan , China and Bangladesh available ?

Comparative figures for lethal drone inventories (armed UCAVs and combat-capable UAVs) are available from open-source estimates as of early 2026, though exact numbers remain classified and vary by source. These focus on reusable strike platforms, excluding most loitering munitions or unarmed recon drones unless explicitly armed.

Key Insights
Pakistan leads regionally in operational armed MALE UCAVs, leveraging Chinese/Turkish imports and indigenous production.

China dwarfs all with its vast production, emphasizing swarm and AI integration.

Bangladesh’s small fleet is modern but limited, while India’s growth hinges on incoming MQ-9B deliveries.

(Figures exclude one-way munitions like kamikaze drones, which all nations are scaling).

Sudarshan Madabushi

What is present population size of Ayyangars? And how large is the size of the “Vadakalai” subsect?

Recently, some friends of mine on a WhatsApp group were engaged in chatter while discussing comparative Jain community population versus Ayyangar community size. Although , the Jains represent a religious minority while Ayyangars represent a Hindu sect , the lively discussion continued nevertheless.

My views stated during the discussions were as follows :

Ayyangars are like Parsis not Jains ….Our community is going rapidly extinct because there’s not much pride left in the Sri Vaishnava identity, sampradaya and heritage.

The Demographics shown below ⬇️ clearly show the trend line projections of the above fact.

India’s Jain population is estimated at around 5.2 million as of 2026. The Ayyangar (also known as Iyengar) community, a Sri Vaishnava Brahmin subgroup primarily in Tamil Nadu, lacks recent official census figures but is roughly estimated at 600,000 based on older data.

Jain Population

The 2011 census recorded 4.45 million Jains in India, or 0.37-0.4% of the total population. Projections for 2026 suggest growth to about 5.2 million, concentrated in states like Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Gujarat, and Karnataka.

Ayyangar (Iyengar) Population

Iyengars form one of the two main Tamil Brahmin groups alongside Iyers, with no precise national census data available. An approximate 2004 estimate places their size at 600,000, mainly in Tamil Nadu’s Cauvery Delta and cities like Chennai and Nagercoil.

Tamil Brahmins overall (Iyers and Iyengars) number around 1,400,000 in Tamil Nadu per some profiles, with Iyengars as a subset.

Ayyangars IMHO are demographically and culturally in decline .

***** *******

Many of my friends were very skeptical of my estimate of 600,000 being the Ayyangar population because admittedly it was based on 2004 non-Census survey estimates. They all countered me saying that in the absence of Census Data … missing since 2011… nothing could be said about the Ayyangar population size and my account of 600,000 was just gross underestimation.

Since , no one knows when the next countrywide Census survey is going to be held, I decided to do a bit of “back-of-the-envelop” statistical calculations to arrive at the best possible estimate of the current population size of Ayyangars with the aid of AI tools.

Below ⬇️ are my findings:

India’s Ayyangar (Iyengar) population, starting from a 2004 estimate of 600,000, would grow to approximately 928,000 today at a 2.0% annual replacement rate over 22 years.

An alternative estimate, using Tamil Nadu’s 2026 population of 77.3 million and assuming Brahmins at 2.5% (about 1.93 million total), yields roughly 966,000 Iyengars if they split evenly with Iyers.[censusofindia +2]

Growth Calculation
Using the compound growth formula P = P_0 \times (1 + r)^t , where P_0 = 600,000 , r = 0.02 , and t = 22 : P \approx 928,000

This aligns closely with the Brahmin-based projection, as Tamil Nadu’s 2004 population was around 65 million, implying the initial 600,000 was about 0.92%—reasonable for Iyengars as a Brahmin subset.

Key Assumptions
• Annual growth rate of 2.0% (midpoint of 1.9-2.1% replacement fertility).
• Brahmin share steady at 2.5% of Tamil Nadu’s population, consistent with common estimates.
• Iyengars ~50% of Tamil Brahmins (Iyers and Iyengars as main subgroups).

The estimate split between Iyers and Ayyangars however as we know empirically was never equal .

It was more like 65:35 or maybe 75:25 in favour of the Iyers.

So , what then would be the resultant estimate of Ayyangar population today ?

Adjusting for a historical Iyer-Iyengar split of 65:35 or 75:25 in favor of Iyers, the Ayyangar population today is estimated at 676,000 to 483,000 using the Brahmin total in Tamil Nadu.
From 600,000 in 2004 at 2% annual growth: 600,000 \times (1.02)^{22} \approx 928,000 .

Direct projection from the 2004 base this yields 928,000, suggesting a blended range of 700,000-800,000.

Split-Based Estimates
Using Tamil Nadu’s projected 2026 population of 77.3 million and 2.5% Brahmins (1.93 million total):

Averaging the direct and split methods gives ~802,000 (65:35) or ~705,000 (75:25).

***** *******

What about the estimate population size of Vadakalai sub-sect ?

Applying further an estimate ratio of the Tenkakai : Vadakalai sub-sect ratio of 70:30, it can be concluded that estimated population of Vadakalai could be +/- circa. 200,000 to 275,000.

So, my original assertion made to my friends — that Ayyangars are demographically and culturally a community in decline — was not far off the mark, was it?

The Ayyangar (Iyengar) community does face demographic decline, driven by low fertility rates, high emigration, and aging populations in traditional strongholds like Tamil Nadu’s temple towns and Brahmin agraharas.

Key Decline Factors

• Migration: Significant exodus to urban centers, metros, and abroad (US, UK) for education and jobs, leaving villages with abandoned homes.
• Fertility below replacement: Like other Tamil Brahmins, Iyengars exhibit rates under 1.9-2.1 children per woman, accelerating shrinkage despite stable or growing state population.
• Cultural shifts: Urbanization erodes traditional practices, with fewer youth marrying within the community or sustaining rituals, compounded by inter-caste unions.

Evidence from Context
This aligns with my prior estimates: a 2004 base of 600,000 projecting to 700k-900k in 2026 ignores outflows, suggesting actual numbers closer to 400k-600k today after net decline. Brahmin neighborhoods near Thanjavur temples are now 30-90% vacant or elderly-occupied.

Sudarshan Madabushi